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#21
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In article , Biz WD=?ISO-8859-1?B?2A==?=HCO
writes: One comment to Mikes Post - Many WW2 Comm RCVRS didn't have Phasing or XTAL Filters - Radio OPs were trained and expected to copy CW perfectly even with a bunch of signals blaring out of the headphones. Just par for the course back then. Myself - I can copy 30 WPM CW with 5 other stations nearby. You train your brain to focus on just one tone and filter everything else out. That ol noodle is a remarkable filter. I often listen to a Halli S-38D on the 40 meter CW band at night and that's what 6 or 8 kc wide?? ISTR that as a Novice, I could do some of that, and some of my fellow Novice ops bragged about it too. Once they upgraded from a Heath AR-3 to SX-99, maybe their skill got rusty :-) Of course most of us can copy "air phone" at a crowded party, picking a friend's converstaion out of equally loud voices in the room. Not that it's easy, but it works. 73, Mike K. Oscar loves trash, but hates Spam! Delete him to reply to me. |
#22
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In article , Biz WD=?ISO-8859-1?B?2A==?=HCO
writes: (2) Britan could not directly go after subs and ships. To do so would tip the Germans that the code was broken and force them to change their wheels on a daily (or hourly) basis. Remember it took 3 weeks (and I suspect much more) to break each code. So even though they had a stolen Enigma and the tools to break the code - it would have been of little use if the code was changed daily. It's a pretty well known story (maybe even true) that the Brits knew the German air raid was coming to Coventry (by breaking the code and/or watching the bombers on radar), several hours in advance, but deliberately did not warn any civil defense or firefighters in Coventry, for fear of tipping the Krauts that we were reading their mail. So apparently Churchill was willing to sacrifce Brit lives, and not jsut US sailors, to hide the code breaking. --Mike K. Oscar loves trash, but hates Spam! Delete him to reply to me. |
#23
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Mike Knudsen wrote:
It's a pretty well known story (maybe even true) that the Brits knew the German air raid was coming to Coventry (by breaking the code and/or watching the bombers on radar), several hours in advance, but deliberately did not warn any civil defense or firefighters in Coventry, for fear of tipping the Krauts that we were reading their mail. So apparently Churchill was willing to sacrifce Brit lives, and not jsut US sailors, to hide the code breaking. --Mike K. Thats the difference in looking at the fact after versus before the occurrence. One of the techniques used by both sides was to send literally hundreds of fake messages along with the 'good' one. This kept the decoding gals busy and still left some doubt about which one(s) were the real messages. If they had copied mail that included every city in Britain as a target...and later one in particular got bombed...its quite easy to say that they knew ahead of time and here's the evidence to prove it. -BM |
#24
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![]() "Biz WDØHCO" wrote in message ... Shipboard receiver installations varied widely depending on how prosperous the shipping company was. Some were every bit as equal to any land installation while others were little more than (as an old timer once told me) a Marconi turd with a cat whisker stuck in it. About training - well first - many Merchant R OPs's joined the Armed Forces right off - so that left those with age, foot or vision problems or retired OPs to man the radio shacks. Most of these men were trained by RCA Worldwide Wireless or Marconi. ALL had many years of practical experience on the high seas. Navy on the other hand had a problem - ships were being built at a fantastic rate and only recently trained "8 Week Wonders" Radio Ops who never had been out to sea to man the shacks. The Navy had to sprinkle experienced Ham Radio and Merchant Marines as lead OPs throughout the fleet to keep things moving till the green horns got up to speed. As it was, there were a number of comical foulups related to mis-communications. Yeah, that makes sense. Yep - Ive heard of stories of passing Convoy ships firing their deck guns on German Life boats - a big Geneva treaty NO NO. Also heard about s broken down U-boat with the whole crew lined up outside on top waving white flags. Passing ship turned toward it, increased speed and rammed it and kept on going. I think it was safe to say there was some serious hatred there. I'll also mention code breaking in the anti-sub war. hmmm ok - where should I start? We are of course talking about the British breaking the codes being sent and received by German Enigma Code machines. Brits are proud of saying their collection of eccentric mathematics wizards and puzzle solving misfits broke the code in something like 3 or 4 weeks. What is glossed over is that the front line German Radio OPs were somewhat lazy and seldom if ever changed the code wheels on the machine. The German high command believed their code machine unbreakable but even so still changed the code wheels on a weekly basis for high level comms. They believed even if front line comms could be broken - they were of little strategic value to the enemy. Of course we now know, if you broken low level comms you can follow the messages up the chain and stand a good chance of breaking that code if you know what is in the message being sent. The Bits did this and now had access to most of the Germany Armed Forces comms. Now what to do with it? What now follows is my own speculation - much of the story still remains classified to this day. I can only go back and look at the historical facts and come up with some fairly logical deductions - ..in other words - I'm guessing... (1) Clearly - Churchill could have told the Americans early on - He choose not to do this until much later. I've read Churchill wanted as much American involvement as possible, particularly after Dunkirk. He was dealing with Roosevelt through Sir William Stephenson. Churchill and Stephenson decided to risk sharing their best intelligence information in order to show Roosevelt that the Great Britian still had a chance. Without the shared intelligence, the deal for the old destroyers and other arms almost certainly would never have gone through. (2) Britan could not directly go after subs and ships. To do so would tip the Germans that the code was broken and force them to change their wheels on a daily (or hourly) basis. Remember it took 3 weeks (and I suspect much more) to break each code. So even though they had a stolen Enigma and the tools to break the code - it would have been of little use if the code was changed daily. You're right. The codes couldn't have been timely enough to locate the subs. Radio location could, but the destroyers and bombers would almost be too late to find anything. The value was, I suppose, more stratigic than tactical (as they say on cable TV) (3) America at the time was isolationist. The Brits saw what a single Jap Attack at Pearl Harbor had done. Almost overnight, America was at war - with Japan. Most Americans wanted to fight the Japs only - they had no beef with Germany. (4) The Lend-Lease convoys were US Merchant Ships carrying U.S. War Material protected by the U.S. Navy Ships manned by US Sailors. The Brits knew the exact locations of German subs out to sink the convoys but kept quiet. The loss of some shipping and American lives would keep the United States focused and involved with the war in Europe. The story is that Roosevelt knew. I can't be sure the story is absolutely true, but it seems credible. I doubt the exact location of the German subs could have been determined in a useful way until aircraft had good radar. (5) As you can imagine - the Americans were livid when finally told. Not so much for the loss of American life but for the fact they were so well played by Churchill. I don't think Roosevelt was played by Churchill. They were pretty much in agreement about defending England, and defeating Hitler. (6) This and the massive defeat ("Heroic Retreat" as the Brits tell it) at Dunkirk were probably the two major factors in selecting an American as Supreme Allied Commander. It would have also have been tougher to maintin a "Hitler First" program in the US, if the Allies were headed up by a Brit. Of course all this is just idle speculation... That's what keeps it fun! I think the code breaking used in the anti-sub effort came much later when it was certain America would join the British War effort. It's my understanding that the code breaking was most useful in the air war of the Battle of Britain. But we may never really know. -B Yeah, I like spy stories as much as anyone, but I can't often tell the BS from the truth or even what is being left out. Frank Dresser |
#25
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Mike Knudsen wrote:
It's a pretty well known story (maybe even true) that the Brits knew the German air raid was coming to Coventry (by breaking the code and/or watching the bombers on radar), several hours in advance, but deliberately did not warn any civil defense or firefighters in Coventry, for fear of tipping the Krauts that we were reading their mail. So apparently Churchill was willing to sacrifce Brit lives, and not jsut US sailors, to hide the code breaking. --Mike K. It may be "a pretty well known story", but it may also be an urban legend". There are indications each way, and I seem to recall having seen it exposed as an urban legend. -- "We have captured lightning and used it to teach sand how to think." |
#26
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In message , Mike Andrews
writes Mike Knudsen wrote: It's a pretty well known story (maybe even true) that the Brits knew the German air raid was coming to Coventry (by breaking the code and/or watching the bombers on radar), several hours in advance, but deliberately did not warn any civil defense or firefighters in Coventry, for fear of tipping the Krauts that we were reading their mail. So apparently Churchill was willing to sacrifce Brit lives, and not jsut US sailors, to hide the code breaking. --Mike K. It may be "a pretty well known story", but it may also be an urban legend". There are indications each way, and I seem to recall having seen it exposed as an urban legend. It is an urban legend. RV Jones explained that a mistake was made in the measurement of the modulation frequency on the beams (1500 c/s instead of 2000 c/s IIRC). So that the modulation frequency on the jammers was set incorrectly. The airborne equipment used very sharp filters so that the jammers were not audible. So Coventry was bombed. Mike -- M.J.Powell |
#27
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In message , Biz WDØHCO
writes Snip I'll also mention code breaking in the anti-sub war. hmmm ok - where should I start? We are of course talking about the British breaking the codes being sent and received by German Enigma Code machines. Brits are proud of saying their collection of eccentric mathematics wizards and puzzle solving misfits broke the code in something like 3 or 4 weeks. I haven't. Some messages were never broken. Some were read immediately. What is glossed over is that the front line German Radio OPs were somewhat lazy and seldom if ever changed the code wheels on the machine. The German high command believed their code machine unbreakable but even so still changed the code wheels on a weekly basis for high level comms. Any decent book on code-breaking will relate this point. I've never known it being 'glossed-over'. Most of the breaking depended on mistakes, or duplication, or repeats of messages without changing the wheel positions. The Luftwaffe was very lax on this point, using the same start position for several messages. They believed even if front line comms could be broken - they were of little strategic value to the enemy. Of course we now know, if you broken low level comms you can follow the messages up the chain and stand a good chance of breaking that code if you know what is in the message being sent. The Bits did this and now had access to most of the Germany Armed Forces comms. Now what to do with it? What now follows is my own speculation - much of the story still remains classified to this day. I can only go back and look at the historical facts and come up with some fairly logical deductions - ..in other words - I'm guessing... (1) Clearly - Churchill could have told the Americans early on - He choose not to do this until much later. I haven't got the question so can't comment on this point. (2) Britan could not directly go after subs and ships. To do so would tip the Germans that the code was broken and force them to change their wheels on a daily (or hourly) basis. Remember it took 3 weeks (and I suspect much more) to break each code. So even though they had a stolen Enigma and the tools to break the code - it would have been of little use if the code was changed daily. The code was changed by the Kreigsmarine daily, sometimes every three hours. (3) America at the time was isolationist. The Brits saw what a single Jap Attack at Pearl Harbor had done. Almost overnight, America was at war - with Japan. Most Americans wanted to fight the Japs only - they had no beef with Germany. (4) The Lend-Lease convoys were US Merchant Ships carrying U.S. War Material protected by the U.S. Navy Ships manned by US Sailors. Err... Some were. The US government's policy was even-handed. Pay for it and collect it. Most convoy ships were European at the start. Only later, after 11th Dec 41, and when the US started building Liberty ships in huge quantities, did the ratio change. The US and Canadian Navy escorted the convoys eastwards to about half-way when they handed over to the RN. Before 11th Dec '41 the USN provided some escort vessels, ie 'Reuben James', which on occassion did engage the U-boats. The Brits knew the exact locations of German subs out to sink the convoys but kept quiet. Rubbish. We wouldn't have lost a single ship if that was so. I can remember the 9.00 BBC news, each evening, starting "The Admiralty regrets to announce the loss of the following ships...." then followed a list of from 2 to 20 ships. It was harrowing. The loss of some shipping and American lives would keep the United States focused and involved with the war in Europe. Bollox. (5) As you can imagine - the Americans were livid when finally told. Not so much for the loss of American life but for the fact they were so well played by Churchill. If only. (6) This and the massive defeat ("Heroic Retreat" as the Brits tell it) at Dunkirk were probably the two major factors in selecting an American as Supreme Allied Commander. Our 'Heroic Defeat' matches your Philipines, I suppose. The RAF lost 200+ fighters defending Dunkirk. Eisenhower for the invasion and afterwards. Which involved at least 60% Brit and Commonwealth troops on the first day. Of course all this is just idle speculation... You should have put that in capitals , and underlined it. I think the code breaking used in the anti-sub effort came much later when it was certain America would join the British War effort. Do you think we wouldn't have done it to save our own ships? But we may never really know. -B We know a lot more than you have written. Mike -- M.J.Powell |
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